The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Economic Community (EC) and Agriculture by Basile, Eva Rook
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 28 
Issue 4 International Agriculture Symposium 
Summer 1993 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
European Economic Community (EC) and Agriculture 
Eva Rook Basile 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eva R. Basile, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Economic Community 
(EC) and Agriculture, 28 Tulsa L. J. 741 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/7 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND




I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTIONIST PRACTICES AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Through the use of publicly funded subsidies to protect loss-making
or non-competitive productive sectors on the international market, civil
society is prepared to constrain certain private sectors of wealth to
achieve national economic growth and expansion. Subsidizing such in-
dustries is a well accepted practice in the so-called industrialized coun-
tries, and must be credited with contributing to the development of
various economic sectors, including agriculture. This area of trade is
marked by certain structural weaknesses.
The modernization of agricultural structures and the forming of
price policies are the two chief methods used by the United States and
the European Community (EC) to develop their agricultural industries,
By the same token, they are also the means by which the the U.S. and the
members of the EC have come to dominate most of the world market for
agricultural products. The increase in agricultural productivity and the
resulting increase in the amount of recordable agricultural production
have, moreover, contributed to the integration of the agricultural sector
with the urban and industrial sectors, thus contributing to accelerated
development of the internal economies of the United States and the EC.
However, the costs of these policies, which fall principally on the
shoulders of the consumers in the EC and the taxpayers in the United
* Professor of Law, University of Siena, Italy; General Secretary, Institute of International
and Comparative Agricultural Law, Florence, Italy.
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States,1 l no longer appear to be tolerable. This is so because of the non-
direct proportionality between the reduction of the subsidies and sur-
pluses and the resulting flux of subsidies which is thereby created. This
flux works to the advantage of the export market in order to reduce sur-
pluses. It is also important to note that surpluses cannot always be
placed on the international market, in part because many of the develop-
ing countries to which they were previously sent are now self-sufficient,
with regard to agricultural production, and in part on account of the
austerity measures adopted by numerous countries that now face finan-
cial troubles.
In substance, then, while the policy of aid has allowed the U.S. and
the EC to compete effectively in the global market for agricultural prod-
ucts, the saturation of demand in their respective markets has forced
them into competition by means of subsidies for surplus products on the
world market. Today the EC is the largest exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts on the world market. The emergence of the EC in this role has lead
to disputes with the United States over the equal division of the world
agriculture market. These disputes, which originally manifested them-
selves as heightened of tension on account of business negotiations and
the respective intervention policies, have led to an increasing awareness
of the seriousness of the situation.
This tension is present not only in relations between the EC and the
United States, but also between the U.S. and the EC and various free
trade zones (ASEAN, for example), which have also seen large sections
of the market disappear as a result of export subsidies paid out by the
U.S. and the EC. The subsidies have the effect of reducing the ability of
products from other countries to compete.
Against this backdrop, the idea of prohibiting or reducing both ex-
port subsidies and domestic subsidies has found popular support. Propo-
nents of this idea point out that export subsidies are primarily responsible
for the progressive destabilization of the world market , and add that
domestic subsidies are equally likely to the promote surpluses in industri-
alized countries. The result is therefore a movement institute a program
that would generally liberalize the international commerce of agricul-
tural products.
This issue, amply discussed at the Uruguay Round of the General
1. The system adopted by the EC to maintain prices at high levels leads to the subsidies be-
coming a burden on the consumer. Vice versa, when the aids are made up of sunk funds, fiscal relief,
and integrations for the producer where the market price is lower than the target price (the so-called
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has reopened old wounds and
caused disputes that had rocked international markets (but had appar-
ently been resolved) to flare up once again. Nations find it difficult not
only to abandon their protectionist policies, but also do away with meas-
ures that run counter to the aims of the GATT.
II. THE GATT AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN
MATERIAL INJURY AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
The institutional framework within which signatory nations (State
Parties or States) of the GATT have agreed to reduce customs duties,
refrain from discriminating against foreign-produced goods (including,
for example, by agreeing not to impose quantitative restrictions), and
generally to afford equal treatment to imports, consists of a series of
measures to which the State Parties must adapt and of counter-measures
to which Contracting Parties can resort in the case of any distortive ef-
fects on the freedom of competition.
The cardinal principles on which free exchange is based are, in sum,
non-discrimination and reciprocity. It therefore follows that equivalence
is the instrument by which the legitimacy of a contemplated counter-
measure should be measured. The latter can be adopted by a State when
an industry in its territory has suffered a material injury as a result of
actions taken by another State Party. The purpose of such a measure is
to neutralize to some extent the injury suffered by the domestic industry.
Countermeasures are thus grounded in the pragmatic principle of neu-
tralizing a prejudice or acting in opposition to injury. The injury expres-
sesin se the breaking of a balance, which only a similar and adverse
counter-action can restore. Therefore, the rationale of the counter-mea-
sure does not lie in the sanction taken in relation to an illicit action, but
rather in the re-establishment of a fair relationship. Thus, in the consid-
eration of counter-measures, whether the subsidy that threatened the bal-
ance is legal or illegal or advisable or poorly advised is immaterial.
The result is that while counter-measures may be adopted in the
case of subsidies that are simply ill-advised, the seriousness of the injury
suffered determines the nature and procedure of the counter-measure.
The difference between the imposition of the countervailing duty (a uni-
lateral solution) and the "material injury" on the one hand, and between
the activation of the control mechanisms foreseen by Articles XVI and
XXIII of the GATT and by Track 2 of the Code on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Duties (a multilateral solution) and the "serious prejudice" or
"adverse effects," on the other, is evident in the rapid neutralization of
19931
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the injury inflicted on the import market by the aid mechanism of the
exporting country. In the latter case, with the objective of abolishing the
perverse effects caused by the subsidy comes about via thediscontinuation
of subsidies by means of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and
recommendations.
As mentioned above, the seriousness of the injury inflicted deter-
mines the scale of the reaction permitted. Conversely, the prohibited or
non-prohibited nature of the subsidy is relevant only as long as it relates
to of the presumption of "adverse or unfavorable effects, thus allowing
the injured country to activate the mechanism of plurilateral guarantee
or, alternatively, to ascertain the existence of circumstances "serious
enough" to authorize the adoption of the measures specified in Article
XXIII (2) of the GATT.
The important role played by both the reintegration of the injury
and the re-establishment of the balance in economic advantages in the
imposition of counter-measures explains the disjunction of this discipline
from that of subsidies and relative prohibitions. This fact is amply
demonstrated by the possibility that coercive measures may also be taken
in the absence of the violation of specific rules if the injury complained of
issufficiently serious. Instead, it is more reasonable to consider the two
disciplines-counter-measures and prohibitions of subsidies-as converg-
ing forces in the establishment of a competitive balance.
III. SUBSIDY REGULATIONS AND THE GATT
Regulations on subsidies differ from regulations that affect counter-
measures (which are generalized for the commerce of all industrial, base,
or primary products') in that they differentiate between the production
and commerce of both industrial and primary products. The difference,
more obviously evident, lies in the liberalization of prohibitions against
export subsidies to export: For primary products, such subsidies are pro-
hibited only when subsidies give the exporting country "more than equi-
table share of the world export trade in that product I or when they create
a visible decline in prices "in a manner which results in prices materially
2. The first formulation also allowed for 'any mineral'; cf. Note to art. XVI, § B, 2 of the
GATT. The exclusion of minerals was established during the Tokyo Round, in note 29 of the Code
on Subsidies.
It should also be added that the note to Art. XVI specifies that by primary products is meant
"any product offarm, forest or fishery in its naturalform, as well as any product 'which has under-
gone only such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume
in international trade".
3. GAIT, art. XVI(B)(3).
[Vol. 28:741
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below those of other suppliers in the same market"' 4 forcing, given the
seriousness of the injury, either a unilateral imposition of countervailing
duties or recourse to the multilateral dispute settlement procedure.
Otherwise, when subsidies produce or threaten to produce a serious prej-
udice, they are merely ill-advisable and lead only to the examination of
the possibility of their containment for the subsidizing State.
These provisions constitute an exception to the general rule that ex-
port subsidies for industrial products is absolutely prohibited when it re-
sults in prejudice. When prejudice occurs, resulting in material injury,
the State harmed by the subsidy is entitled unilaterally to adopt universal
countervailing duties. If the harm takes the form of nullification of a
benefit achieved under the GATT, the State may resort to the multilat-
eral procedure. Finally,if the injury manifests itself as serious prejudice,
the State can limit the offending subsidy voluntarily.
These regulations, later integrated with the anti-dumping measures
contained in the norms adopted in the Kennedy Round (1967), and fur-
ther defined in the Tokyo Round (1979), sanction the selling by a pro-
ducer of its product on foreign markets at a price lower than that at
which the producer sells it in its own national market, or, at any rate, at
a price less than the cost of production. The anti-dumping Code, to-
gether with subsidy regulations, represents, through their reciprocal inte-
gration, the complete set of regulations for the market. In fact, while
dumping can be practiced even with the use in the production chain of
products benefiting from subsidies, the anti-dumping measures-which
consist substantially in the same counter-measures foreseen for export
subsidies-can be taken in those cases where it is not possible to repress
the subsidies, given that these are not immediately visible.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that aid does not always lead to
dumping; thus, this last is condemned only when it causes a prejudice,
while the discipline of export aids demonstrates, with regard to these lat-
ter, a stricter attitude based on not only the counter-measure system, but
also on the obligation of States to given notification of every subsidy.
With regard to production subsidies, these are in theory permitted,
provided that they are not actually turned into export subsidies.' As a
result, they are ill-advisable - given that they allow for the adoption of
4. Code on Subsidies, art 10(3).
5. Art. Il of the Code on Subsidies lists the possible reasons for the adoption of production
subsidies, attempting to mark the boundaries between domestic subsidies and export subsidies, attrib-
uting to the first, socio-economic objectives and an absence of discriminatory aims. The Code on




Basile: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European E
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the multilateral procedure - when they nullify or impair any benefit
accruing directly or indirectly under the Agreement, or impede the at-
tainment of any objective of the Agreement.
Despite precise modifications introduced in 1979 by the Code on
subsidies, the specific set of norms foreseen for primary products (farm,
forest, or fishery products) still shows a large number of ambiguities.
These, together with the fact that States have recourse to numerous
forms of aid for subsidising the export of agricultural products and the
fact that it is not always easy to establish whether alimentary products
are agricultural or industrial since they are the result of processing, are
substantially responsible for the economic-commercial conflict between
the EC and the USA.
The multilateral approach, which is increasingly necessary for the
interdependence of the economies, therefore has difficulty in reconciling
the different support policies of the agricultural sector.
From the viewpoint of the competitor country, the variety of instru-
ments adopted produces an artificial barrier to the free application of the
rules of the market, fully justiflying thereby the application of counter-
measures which are in their turn liable to determine others on the part of
the adversaries.
The conflict between the USA and the EC concerning pasta and
wheat meal highlights the most acute point of disagreement in the mech-
anism of "export refunds" practised by the EC, by which profitable
prices are guaranteed to the community exporter; however, from the
American point of view, in allowing for price quotations which do not
correspond to production costs, these appear as an attempt to assure Eu-
ropean exporters of an unfair advantage. This conflict does, however,
mark an important turning-point in Community agricultural policy.6
IV. THE EEC COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The organisation of the EC market is based on a twofold system of
internal and external prices, in which the two levels are strictly linked.
To be more precise, Community price policy constitutes the main instru-
ment by which to uphold farmers' incomes, and to assure the availability
of supplies, and it is directed, together with structural policy, towards
guaranteeing farmers a standard of living which is comparable to that of
other economic categories.
Market policy, implemented by means of price policy, constitutes
6. Cf. further, Id. sub 5.
[Vol. 28:741
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the Common Market Organisation and is comparmentalised into single
productive divisions; the model on which it is developed is however basi-
cally that outlined for cereals in Regulation N*120 of 1967, subsequently
modified many times. 7 It establishes, as far as the internal market is con-
cerned, the annual fixing of a target price, that is to say, the price which a
given product should actually reach, in the area of greatest shortfall in
the Community; this takes into account not only the demand and offer of
the wholesale product, but also the production costs, the farmers' profits,
and the financial consequences on the EC balance. The target price
marks the limit above which it becomes more advantageous to import the
product from third countries.
The guarantee for farmers' profits is, instead, agreed on by means of
the intervention price, which is less than that of the target price, and to
which the Community intervention boards are tied in buying the
product.
This profit is further guaranteed by production aid which takes the
form of a subsidy normally fixed for every hectare of surface area culti-
vated for the harvest of those products for which the so-called integration
has been granted. This form of aid integrates the incomes of the pro-
ducer, given that it is calculated, as stated above, according to the surface
area cultivated (as in the case of durum wheat, for example), or, occa-
sionally, to the quantitative product (as in the case of olive oil).
As to the international market, the Community regulates the ex-
changes through the system of levies on importation, which are applied to
those products coming from third countries at a lower price than that of
the Community. In this manner, the threshold price (that is the target
price less the cost of transportation to the centre of greatest shortfall in
the Community) fixed by the Community reaches that of the non-Com-
munity product, thereby re-establishing the desired competitive relation-
ship between the Community and imported products.
7. It should also be noted that the market organisations of agricultural products can take
different forms; the most complex is that of cereals, with its target, intervention, and threshold
prices, the production aids to durum wheat, the levies on importation, and export refunds. This is
also true for rice, sugar, fatty goods, and dairy products.
The least complex form is represented by several products listed in Annex II of the Treaty
(several types of animals, meat, and giblets; several types of fodder; live plants; floricultural prod-
ucts). It does not provide for any intervention measures or price support, but only for the application
of customs duties for foreign products.
Other forms of market organisation exist which are provided with incomplete intervention
mechanisms (as in the case of horticultural products, tobacco, sheep and goat meat, pork, beef, eggs,
poultry, wines, flax, and hemp). As a rule, interventions by means of direct purchase are not fore-
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On the world market the balance between the price of the product
formed on the latter and the target price fixed by the Community is guar-
anteed by means of export refunds, a premium offered at the moment of
export to integrate the European exporter with the difference in price
when this is lower on the world market than on the Comunity market86.
It should at this point be observed that the principal aim of this type
of policy is to guarantee the Community market from eventual disecono-
mies which can come about as the result of internal imbalances and ex-
ternal factors. The protectionist policy of the common organisation of
the market, based on the stabilisation of the internal market and the de-
fence of Community products on the world market, can sometimes give
rise to situations which are perverse, as a result of the close ties which
exist between the two policies of internal and external prices. And, in
fact, internal support, by producing a surplus, is a determining factor in
the choice of exporting, for which, however, aid in the form of refund is
indispensable, given the rise of Community price with respect to world
price, which this same operation has produced.
These disfunctions might well contribute to a feeling of 'unfairness'
in the mechanism of the Common Market Organisation policy. This in-
strument is, however, very well suited to the aims of the Community, as
the targets reached by the latter regarding the levels of production and
market of its members and its position on the world market go to show.
It should rather be pointed out that this type of organisation, the funda-
mental rules of which are described above, was expected, from the mo-
ment of the Community's founding, to exhaust its role within a relatively
short period of time, i.e., to function up to the moment in which the
agricultural producers of the Community would manage to achieve an
adequate standard of living and an equally adequate competitivity on the
international market. In other words, the price policies set up by the
Community have never represented a set of aims as such, but, rather, an
instrument to be used together with that of structural policy, the efficacy
of which is, for intrinsic reasons, less incisive and more diluted over time.
V. STRUCTURAL POLICY
The interdependence between agricultural structure and market,
and the consequent necessity for a strict connection between the policies
in these fields is clearly expressed in Article 39 (1) and (2), 9 as well as in
8. Cf. what has been said above about dumping. The export refunds can be turned into a sort
of "official" dumping.
9. The aims of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as stated in Article 39 (1), are a) the
[Vol. 28:741
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Articles 42 and 43 of the EEC Treaty.10 The combined reading of these
rules clearly shows the necessity of considering the agricultural market
from two different points of view, that of the regulations on competition,
and that of the intervention in the productive system by the means of aid.
The basis of the Community system is constituted by Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty; these prohibit agreements and abuse of a dominant
position wherever it is likely that these will distort competition between
the Member States, while Article 92 also expresses the general rule of the
prohibition of aid to undertakings. 1 However, it is well-known that agri-
culture is based above all on the necessity for an ample action of transfor-
mation in the most economic directions, so as to guarantee supplies and
the attainment of a reasonable standard of living for the farmers. This
requires a policy of structural modernisation, together with a policy of
harmonisation of the laws of Member States.
The necessity for combined action in the fields of structural inter-
vention and price adaptation finds its effective fulfilment in the Guidance
Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF) - through which structural aids are granted for the adapta-
tion and improvement of the conditions of production in agriculture, the
adaptation and guidance of agricultural production, the adaptation and
increasing agricultural productivity b) the ensuring of a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community c) the stabilising of markets d) the ensuring of the availability of supplies and of e)
reasonable prices for consumers.
Art. 39 continues as follows: "In working out the common agricultural policy and the special
methods for its application, account shall be taken of. a) the particular nature of agricultural activity,
which results from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities be-
tween the various agricultural regions; b) the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees; c)
the fact that in the Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a
whole"
10. The Treaty rules on competition (Artt. 85-90), dumping (Art.91) and State aids (Artt. 92-
93) shall, according to Art.42 par. I "apply to the production of and trade in agricultural products
only to the extent determined by the Council within the framework of Article 43 (2) and (3) and in
accordance with the procedure laid down therein, account being taken of the objectives set out in
Article 39."
11. According to Art.92 (1) "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market". Article 93 governs
the procedure to be followed by the Commission in cases involving alleged breaches of Art.92.
Art.2 of the Regulation 26/62 exempts from the operation of Treaty Article 85 (1) all such
agreements, decisions, and practices "as form an integral part of national market organisations or are
necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. In particular, it shall
not apply to agreements, decisions and practices of farmers, farmers' associations, or associations of
such associations belonging to a single Member State which concern the production or sale of agricul-
tural products or the use of joint facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural
products, and under which there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless the Commission
finds that competition is thereby excluded or that the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty are
jeopardised."
9
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improvement of the marketing of agricultural products and the develop-
ment of outlets for agricultural products - as well as in the Guarantee
Section - which covers the costs relative to the interventions made on
the internal and external markets, that is, to the interventions on the
prices which have already been described.
In this description of production guidance and adaptation, Commu-
nity action with regard to producers' organisations should be mentioned,
directed as it is towards recognising the role-which trend making, market
adaptation and regulations play in the operating fields of the agricultural
producers' organisations. In organisations of this type - which are fi-
nanced by the Guarantee Section - the meeting point between structural
and market policies is more clearly perceptible than in many other areas,
recognisable in the members' adoption of common regulations for pro-
duction and intervention actions on the market.
VI. THE EC AND THE GATT: DIFFERING VIEWS ON DISCIPLINE
AND AGRICULTURE COMMERCE.
The features described above of the twofold Community interven-
tion on structures and prices show the special character of EC agricul-
tural policy. This special character is also discernible in the regulations of
the GATT, above all in those regulations which derogate prohibitions on
subsidies for export or production either totally or partially. Therefore, it
would not be appropriate to reach any over-simplistic or hurried conclu-
sions affirming that Community regulations (and any consequent inter-
ventions) are in conflict with those of the GAT. Rather, it would seem
more correct to note that the challenges which the world market poses
today have changed with respect to the past, in the same way as has the
agricultural competitivity of the EC countries.
If, then, the time is ripe for reflecting on new agreements for the
trade of agricultural products within the GATT - as the Uruguay
Round meetings and the very recent EC-USA Washington agreement of
the 20th November, 1992 would suggest, 2 then it is also possible to
claim that it is difficult to discern in the Community regulations any
preclusions of a technical-legal order to the above-mentioned new adap-
tations. Neither can the illegality of Community interventions on the
12. However, now cf. the recent (February 1993) worried statements of the Secretary General
of the GATT, Mr Arthur Dunkel, now faced with some measures endorsed by the Clinton adminis-
tration (the raising of taxes on steel imports from 19 countries accused of dumping, the threat of
exclusion from EC undertakings from government contracts, the reopening of negotiations in fields
where agreements have been reached at the Uruguay Round).
[Vol. 28:741
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prices of agricultural products on the grounds of the not-unreasonable
American counter-measures be presumed, according to the rules of the
GATT. Indeed, the existence of a legal cause and effect relation between
counter-measure and aid is not envisaged in the GATT, while, on the
contrary, that of an economic cause and effect relation between a
counter-measure and a breach in the balance of exchanges, caused by the
injury which the former is directed towards repairing, is envisaged.
These observations are certainly not such as to warrant abstention
from the search for alternative solutions with regard to the international
trade of agricultural products, amongst which can be noted that of ex-
tending to these latter the prohibition of both export aid and privileges
granted to national products as opposed to those which are imported,
and going so far, if necessary, as to limit production subsidies. The prob-
lem is, however, still that of arriving at a mutual understanding, from
both the economic and, above all, the legal point of view. This can only
be reached through the comparison of the various national "legal
tools" 3 11, the aim of which would be to understand the rationale which
underlies these, together with all the differences between them; this pro-
cess would aim at establishing a new multilateral and parallel organisa-
tion, as well as the institutionalisation of this"4 12.
VII. AGRICULTURE AS A PRIMARY PRODUCT AND THE PROBLEM
OF UPSTREAM SUBSIDIES
Together with the commitment which transpires from the numerous
13. Cf. e.g., for the EC regulation 2176/84 of Sept. 17, 1984, now substituted by Regulation
2423/88 of July 11 th, 1988, with regard to dumping and subsidies by non-EC countries, and Regula-
tion 2641/84 of September 17th, 1984, regarding defence against unfair and unreasonable practices.
For the USA, cf. the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. It must be remembered that,
according to Art. 113 (1) of the Rome Treaty, the common commercial policy is of exclusive compe-
tence of the Community which has therefore succeeded to the Member States with regard to the
obligations arising from the GATr.
14. From this point of view, it is interesting to examine the question of the directly binding
character of the rules of the GATT. As far as regards the European Community, the Court of
Justice, in its judgement of 12th December, 1972, in the case of International Fruit, negated the
possibility of direct application of the provisions of the General Agreement, maintaining the
,.programmatic" , and therefore non-"self-executing" nature of the Agreement as a whole. It follows
that the single citizens of the Community do not have the right to judicially demand the observance
of the rules of the GATT, given that the Court of Justice examines commercial agreements from the
only point of view which it is competent to hold, that is, from the point of view of a possible violation
of the EC Treaty. This jurisprudence has been confirmed in the cases of Schluter (24th October,
1973) and Spi-Sami (16th March, 1983). Instead the Italian Court of Cassation, in its judgements of
6th July, 1968, N[degree sym]2293 and 20th October, 1976, N[degree sym]3616, has confirmed the
direct applicability of the GATT rules. The Constitutional Court also concurred in this position,
with reference to Article III of the General Agreement, in its decisions of 20th May, 1982, N[degree
sym]96, and 25th July, 1985, N[degree sym]219.
19931
11
Basile: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European E
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
meetings of the Uruguay Round to resolve the problem of the trade of
agricultural products (not through an unnatural levelling out of the lat-
ter's regulation in line with the rules of the international commerce of
industrial products, but via the renewal of agreements according to the
agricultural sector's own rules), the previously-stated observations high-
light the overriding need to single out and clarify the boundaries of the
question.
As already stated, the 1979 Code circumscribes the notion of pri-
mary products to those of farm, forestry, and fishery. The comparison of
this specification with that of the agricultural question according to
Art.38 of the EEC Treaty shows analogies from only certain points of
view. Indeed, the intention of singling out one area of products with com-
mon marketable characteristics and destined for human consumption
unites, in both sets of regulations, agricultural and fishery products.
Other points of contact can be discerned in the common classification of
primary products as those which are the result of the economic activity
known as primary - agricultural and extractive (fishery) -, and of pri-
mary commodities as those which do not derive from the processing of a
primary product. Thus both regulations trace a demarcation line between
agricultural and alimentary activities, and, therefore, between the com-
merce of agricultural and alimentary products.
With regard to this, it should however be underlined that the text of
Article XVI of the GATT would lead, according to the construction of
this rule as provided by Note 29, to the classification under base and
primary agricultural products of also those products processed only to
the extent held necessary for the trade of the base product. In this way,
the area of commerce of agricultural products is circumscribed in a more
rigorous and restricted manner than can be deduced from the EC Treaty,
whose Annex II* to Article 38 carries a series of second and third-stage
processing products which are also considered to be agricultural insofar
as the trade of agricultural products is concerned. 5 On the other hand,
in its definition of agricultural products, the EC Treaty, unlike the
GATT, does not include wood, which is thus excluded from the applica-
tion of rules on the trade of agricultural products. This despite, as the
more recent Community measures have clearly highlighted, the interest
15. Article 38 (1) provides that "agricultural products means the products of the soil, of stock-
farming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these products".
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in forestry shown by the inclusion of such activity in the agricultural
category as regards reforms and structural interventions.
Such differences are not of small account if reference is made to the
EC-USA disputes regarding pasta and wheat meal, in which the princi-
pal point to emerge has been that of the argument over the "primary"
nature of the products in question. The problem is strictly connected to
the position of unjustified competitivity in which the processed product
can sometimes find itself when it is derived from a primary product, the
cost of which is inferior to that practised by the suppliers of competing
firms. It can happen that processing firms buy primary products in their
own or other countries at artificially low prices thanks to the subsidies
granted to these; they then export the finished product to countries
whose competing firms, disadvantaged with respect to the low cost of the
primary material, end up by being non-competitive. The question -
which presents, as is well-known, the problem of the classification of the
unlawful act coming from the so-called upstream subsidies and therefore
from the reinsertion of these cases under the categories of dumping or
export subsidy - can take on enormous dimensions, given that the pri-
mary product, when it is agricultural, is usually the recipient of a subsidy
not only at the production stage, but also at the export stage.
VIII. THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE REFORM OF THE COMMON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The need for a greater transparency in the regulations for agricul-
tural subsidies is, without doubt, the departure point for the development
of new agreements in the GAIT, if a desire to carry this out actually
exists16 14; it also, however, provides the general premise for avoiding an
improper use of countervailing duties. It would be unacceptable, in fact,
not to take into due consideration, in positive terms also, the efficacy of
the counter-measure in maintaining the balance of international commer-
cial exchanges. However, sight should also not be lost of the other side of
the coin - this time negative, given the possibility that the counter-
vailing duty could be transformed into an instrument functional to pro-
tectionist policies.
16. There is much discussion with regard to the timeliness of dividing the domestic subsidies
into trade-distorting support measures ("amberpolicies") and policies which have at most a minimal
impact on ("trade policies" or policies in the "Green Box"). The Green Box covers a wide range of
support measures, including general government services in the areas of research, disease control,
infrastructures, environment protection, and food security; it also includes direct payment to produ-
cers, for example, certain forms of income support, structural adjustment assistance, direct payments
under environmental programmes and regional assistance programmes.
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The protraction of the Uruguay Round negotiations gives a clear
indication of the difficulties involved in coming to a common understand-
ing capable of balancing opposing demands, these last also determined by
the objective structural differences in the agricultural economic realities
of the various countries participating in the negotiations.
The reform of the common agricultural policy, which has, however,
been evolving over the last five years, indicates not only the solution of
the internal problems of the Community, but also the choice of a solution
which would be capable of mediating Community interests with those of
competing countriest 715, and a full awareness of the fact that the correct
regulation of a free exchange is, today, the essential premise for the de-
velopment of national economies.
It should also be taken into account that the passing of time has for
the European Community marked programmes and operations which
are very different and far removed from those for which the protectionist
policy towards the external markets constituted the indispensable instru-
ment for the consacration of free exchange on its internal market, and,
therefore, for the realisation of a single market. Moreover, it should be
remembered that the Community has over time developed a series of
objectives which are far more ambitious than those outlined in the 1958
Rome Treaty, that is to say, the objectives expressed in the Single Euro-
pean Act of 1987 and the Treaty on European Union signed in Maas-
tricht on 7th February, 1992, in the process of being ratified: inevitably,
these have interacted and are still interacting with the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP).
As for this last point, the most significant aspects regard the direct
interventions on the containment of surpluses. The tools used sometimes
take the form of incentives, forcing the producer to behave in a certain
way (in this case by reducing production) if he intends to benefit from aid
(as in the case of incentivations for the reduction of productions, e.g.,
premiums, following the slaughtering of dairy cows, or the eradication of
vineyards, apple orchards, and mandarin crops). In other cases the con-
straint takes the form of an obligation placed on the producer, as in the
case of the prohibition of new implantations of specific plants, i.e., vine-
yards, in the fixing of production quotas (for example, in reference to
sugar and milk), and in the instituting of producer co-responsibility levies
in the cereals sector. The third area is that of the limitation on aids for
17. Article 100 of the EC treaty foresees, amongst its objectives, that of "contribut(ing), in the
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade."
[Vol. 28:741
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production to the producers of oil-seeds and several types of horticultural
products, when these have already been granted.
Together with these interventions are several measures directed to-
wards an increase in the forests (Regulation N*2080/92) and in the level
of environmental protection (Regulation N'2078/92). The characteristic
which is common to measures of this type is their principal aim of reduc-
ing any surpluses by having recourse to regulations which aid the ecolog-
ical balance, and which can therefore be seen more as instruments than
as ends. With regard to the premise that to the ends of surplus contain-
ment it may be helpful to adopt a policy favouring quality rather than
quantity, the EC supports the cultivation of areas naturally fit for a spe-
cific production with the consequent conversion of marginal lands, or at
any rate of those on which no production would be remunerative without
a disproportionately large amount of public aid; another instrument is
that of the support of cultivation and processing without the use of chem-
ical substances (e.g., by the assignment of aids to the producers who
adopt such an approach).
Returning to the topic of production stabilizers, the most important
is that of production quota systems, already provided for in the sugar and
milk sectors, and which today can be said to have been extended, from
several points of view, to the production of cereals, oil-seeds, and
proteinic plants.
The system, as is already well-known, functions through a forced
adjustment in production - and, therefore, through the control of the
potential develoment of the offer - so as to contain this under a quanti-
tative-limit. The system, introduced into the sugar sector since the insti-
tution of its common market organisation (1968), leads to a
differentiation of the guarantee in the price and distribution on the basis
of production quotas, so that for production which goes beyond the
quota there can be no price guarantee, and this will therefore be exported
at the world market price. Moreover, what is enforced is the principle of
the producers' financial responsibility, and it is these last who shoulder
the cost of disposing of Community production surpluses; this then is the
principle expressed through the imposition of a co-responsibility levy
which is undertaken by the producers.
On this same principle of co-responsibility functions the quota sys-
tem for the dairy products sector (introduced in 1984), although the
quota can rest on either the producer or the dairy which collects the
milk. The milk-quota system, however, has not been able to completely
1993]
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fulfil the economic and financial objectives established by the Commu-
nity; as a result, this has adopted a specific system of incentivation to
leave the sector.
The same principle of co-responsibility resting on the producer, as
an instrument for the containing of production, has also been used in the
cereals sector. However, as is already well-known, this production has
increased steadily until reaching surplus levels which are financially un-
sustainable by the Community, as well as being intolerable for the USA,
given the effects they have had from the point of view of export refunds.
The solution adopted by the Community in 1992, and which has been
well-received by the GATT, can be summed up in the programme for
production containment by means of the setting-aside of land to be sown,
and in the shifting of the subsidy from the market to the farmers' income.
The system of set-aside had already been foreseen by Regulation
N*1094/88, together with other measures directed towards the contain-
ment of productions through incentives to conversion and extensification
of production (Regulation N*1094/88) and the early retirement of farm-
ers from agricultural activity (Regulation N*1096/88, now substituted by
Regulation N*2079/92).
However, the new system of intervention (Regulation N0 1765/92)
abolishes the old system of set-aside and introduces the obligation of
"freezing"15% of the farm's surface area. This "freezing" constitutes the
condition for the granting of the production aid which is granted at the
rate of cultivated hectares for a total determined by the average yields,
for geographical areas, communicated in advance by the Member States.
If Regulation N*1765/92 is analysed together with the intervention
prices which are established along the same lines for all cereals for the
year 1993/94 by Regulation N*1766/92, it is possible to see that the shift
from market support to farmers' incomes should have the effect of reduc-
ing production. This reduction, then, should be further assured by the
fact that the aid, apart from being granted per hectare rather than per
quintal, is granted following the fulfilment of the obligation not to exceed
the surface of seeded areas which have benefited from the aid system
during the years 1989 or1990 or 1991. In substance, then, in the cereals
sector just as in the oil-seed and proteinic plants sector - expressly fore-
seen in Regulation N*1765/92 - the production quota system is the
strategic instrument for a correct functioning of aid; it weighs neither too
heavily on the consumer nor on the collectivity.
Although the "decoupling" of price aids and income aids activated
by the CAP of 1992 does not entirely satisfy the USA, above all with
[Vol. 28:741
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regard to the intervention on oil-seeds, it has however stimulated the rec-
ognition necessary for the resolution of the ongoing negotiations. The
particulars of the Washington agreement of 20th November 1992 foresee:
a) as regards the import system, a consistent reduction in the relative
tariffs, whilst still recognising a 'special safeguard mechanism' for the
Community to protect the Community market from the excessive fluctu-
ations of world prices; b) the pledge to reduce production subsidies by
20% in relation to the period 1986-88, without, however, this reduction
hitting the aids to farmers' incomes; c) the pledge to reduce, over a pe-
riod of six years, the volume of exports and relative aids, respectively by
21% and 36%.
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The preceding observations show that it is a short step to the predic-
tion of a positive conclusion to the drawn-out negotiations of the Uru-
guay Round. In reality, it would seem that the almost total lack of
understanding between the EC and the USA, underlined at some mo-
ments by serious commercial disputes, has been replaced by an attitude
showing a greater flexibility towards the adoption of common solutions,
even if these are destined, at first sight, to restrict national interests.
However, although today there certainly seem to be all the premises nec-
essary for the friendly solution of past conflicts, it is impossible not to be
aware of the dangers which private and national interests still present,
now taking the form of protectionist policies which are less apparent and
more sophisticated, but which are for all this no less dangerous.
If it is true that at this point all the parties see free exchange as being
the most preferable solution for all the advantages which it confers in
terms of a collective benefit, it should however be said that the attain-
ment of such a situation is not easy. This is not because it is necessary to
overcome the instinctive attraction for mercantilism which still continues
to exist, but because the existence of certain protected productive sectors
or the choice of the kind of protection to be accorded to certain produc-
tive sectors are strictly connected to a country's political choices, in fact
sometimes the latter are dependent on those. Thus the balance between
mercantilism and free exchange finishes by representing, in the actions of
governments, the necessary condition for their own survival.
Therefore the search for possible solutions would appear to be any-
thing other than easy, and this independently of the conflicts of interest
between different countries. At the bottom of this is the problem that the
19931
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reduction of aid to agriculture may enter into conflict with other impor-
tant objectives of political economy; moreover, the extremely heterogene-
ous nature of world agriculture, on which different levels of average
earnings pro capite depend, should not be underestimated.
These observations demand, in the determining of the policy con-
cerning agriculture, the recognition of a much wider field of investiga-
tion. To these should be added the ulterior consideration which
technological developments, the faculty of transport, and the instability
and complexity of the international monetary system tend to upset the
traditional relationship between national politics and international eco-
nomics, making the international economic reality of agriculture lose its
traditional appearance of a simple intersection between the national
economies. The impression which ensues is that the world agricultural
situation presents the characteristics of a global system, in which na-
tional realities cannot however be integrated to the point of having to
destroy their individual characteristics.
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